Security and privacy overview
What WZRD stores, where it lives, who can see it, what leaves the system and what still needs fixing. Version 1.2 · 21 November 2026.
WZRD is a teacher co-pilot for Australian primary schools. Teachers photograph or scan student work, record voice notes, run reading and maths checks, and plan lessons. WZRD reads the work, drafts feedback and summaries, and keeps a learning profile for each child. The teacher approves everything before it is filed.
This document describes what WZRD stores, where, who can see it, what leaves the system, and how it is protected. It is written to be checked, not to reassure. Each statement says whether it is In place (built and tested), Partial (built with a known limit), or Not yet (planned or recommended). Section 11 lists every known gap and the fix for each.
1. Summary
| Question | Short answer |
|---|---|
| Who owns the data? | The school (data owner). WZRD acts as a processor on the school's behalf. |
| Who can see a teacher's data? | The teacher who created it. Other teachers cannot see it. The system operator can technically reach it in the database dashboard (see 4.4). |
| Where is it stored? | A Supabase project in the Sydney (ap-southeast-2) region, confirmed in the dashboard on 9 October 2026 (see 3.1). Daily backups are on. |
| Does any of it leave Australia? | Not by design. Storage is in Sydney. AI processing runs in AWS: Claude through Amazon Bedrock with Australian routing (Sydney and Melbourne only) and speech through Amazon Transcribe in Sydney. The server functions refuse any other region (see 5). The companies involved (Amazon, Supabase, Google, Anthropic as model maker) are headquartered overseas. |
| Are student names sent to the AI? | In text prompts, names are replaced with codes (Student-07) before sending. Photos of handwritten pages are sent as images, so a name written on the page reaches the AI. The class list is no longer sent with the page; the name is matched to the class on the device. That processing happens in Australia (see 6 and 11, item 1). |
| Is student data used to train AI? | WZRD never uses it for training and never sells it. AWS states that content processed by Bedrock is not used to train the underlying models; confirm the current wording in the school agreement (see 5.3). |
| Can data be deleted? | Yes: More → Delete my account and data. File deletion is incomplete today (see 11, item 3). |
| Do children have accounts? | No email accounts. On wzrd.school a child signs in with their class code and their own picture code, or with a school Google account where the school has set that up. The teacher can sign the class out at any time (see 7). |
2. What WZRD stores
| Data | Examples | Held in |
|---|---|---|
| Class and student records | Names, year level, optional student ID, avatar, groups, goals, strengths and next steps | One JSON workspace per teacher (database) |
| Evidence | Work photos, scanned pages, typed work, reading and maths results, writing marks, art photos, STEM journal entries, comprehension results, work bundles and their summaries | Workspace JSON (text and thumbnails) plus the private file bucket (full images) |
| Voice | Voice notes typed or dictated into text; reading recordings of children reading aloud | Text in the workspace; recordings in the private bucket and on the device |
| Teacher account | Email, name, school, state, sector, year level, class name | profiles table and Supabase Auth |
| Usage records | Counts and feature names ("capture", "approve"). No student content | events table |
| AI audit log | For each AI call: step name, success, time taken, confidence, character count, token counts. No prompt or answer text | ai_runs table |
WZRD does not collect: home addresses, phone numbers, parent contact details, health or disability information, photos of faces by design (the upload guidance is "crop to work, no faces"), or behavioural or wellbeing data beyond the teacher's own private notes.
Teacher-only notes. Wellbeing comments from voice notes are marked private to the teacher and are not used in parent-facing outputs.
3. Where data lives, and how it is hosted
3.1 Components
| Component | What it does | Data it handles | Location |
|---|---|---|---|
| AWS hosting (S3, CloudFront, Route 53) | Serves the web apps (static files) at wzrd.com.au and wzrd.school; Netlify until 10 November 2026 | None. The sites contain no student data | Files in S3, Sydney; served through CloudFront |
| Supabase | Sign-in, database, private file storage, server functions | All teacher and student data | Sydney (ap-southeast-2): confirmed in the dashboard 9 October 2026, and on 21 November 2026 both projects' database addresses checked against AWS's published Sydney ranges |
Supabase Edge Functions (claude, transcribe, student, family-weekly, family-billing, stripe-webhook) | Hold the AWS keys and call the AI services on the teacher's behalf | Pass-through only (see 5) | Called with the Sydney region pinned; the function code refuses any region other than ap-southeast-2 or ap-southeast-4 |
| Amazon Bedrock (Claude, made by Anthropic) | Reads pages, drafts feedback, summaries and reports | Page images and pseudonymised text, per request | AWS Sydney with Australian cross-region routing (Sydney and Melbourne only). The overseas fallback was removed from the code on 26 October 2026 |
| Amazon Transcribe | Turns a child's reading recording into words | Audio only, no names. Stored in a private Sydney bucket for the length of the job, deleted straight after; the bucket also expires objects after one day | AWS Sydney |
| Amazon SES | Account emails and WZRD Family's emails, from noreply@wzrd.com.au | The recipient's email address. The emails say nothing about any child | AWS Sydney |
| Stripe | WZRD Family Premium payments | A parent's email and account id only, never a child's name or anything about a child | Stripe (global) |
| Google Fonts, cdnjs, jsDelivr | Fonts and code libraries loaded by the browser | The browser's request (IP address, page) | Global CDNs |
| The teacher's device | Working copy of the data for speed and offline use | See 8 | Wherever the device is |
3.2 Two ways to run it
- The signed-in app (wzrd.com.au). Data syncs to the Sydney database. This is the version for real class data.
- The demo (wzrd.com.au/demo). Made-up sample children, for trying WZRD. Not for real student data.
4. Access control
4.1 Authentication
- In placeSupabase Auth with email and password. Sessions use short-lived tokens that refresh automatically.
- PartialSign-ups are open and "Confirm email" is switched off in the pilot setup, so anyone can create an account instantly. A new account sees only its own empty workspace, but unlimited accounts can be made (see 11, item 6).
- PartialTwo-step sign-in (an authenticator app) is required for school admins, the office and Learning Diversity staff, and is enforced in the database as well as the app. Teachers and year leaders do not need it yet (see 11, item 7).
- Not yetsingle sign-on for teachers with school accounts, and an enforced minimum password strength beyond Supabase's default.
4.2 Authorisation: each teacher sees only their own rows
- In placeRow-level security is enabled on all four tables (
profiles,workspaces,events,ai_runs). Each policy allows a row to be read or written only when the signed-in user's ID matches the row's owner. - In placeThe file bucket (
pages) is private. Files sit in a folder named after the teacher's user ID, and a storage policy allows access only to that folder. - VerifyThe storage policy is created inside a block that skips silently if the project refuses it. After setup, confirm it exists under Storage → Policies. Without it, only the bucket being private protects files.
- In placeThe database and storage use the public "anon" key in the web page, which is safe by design because row-level security does the protecting. The powerful
service_rolekey and the database password are never placed in the app or shared.
4.3 The AI gateway
- In placeBoth server functions require a valid signed-in session ("Verify JWT" on) and reject anonymous calls.
- In placeA per-account daily cap on Claude calls (default 300), recorded in
ai_runs. - In placeAI provider keys exist only as Supabase secrets. They are never sent to the browser.
- In place(9 October 2026) The functions answer browsers only from wzrd.com.au, its subdomains and localhost. Authentication still applies.
4.4 Operator access
The person who runs the Supabase project can open the database and storage dashboards and can technically read all workspaces. There is no "break glass" audit trail beyond Supabase's own logs. Recommended controls: a single named operator, a strong unique password with multi-factor authentication on the Supabase, AWS and GitHub accounts, and a written rule that dashboards are opened only to deliver support the school has asked for.
4.5 Teacher approval
- In placeAI output is a draft. Feedback cards, summaries, reports and skill ratings do not update a child's record until a teacher approves them. This limits the harm of a wrong or biased AI output.
- PartialAn optional setting can auto-approve high-confidence reads. It is off unless the teacher turns it on.
5. What is sent to AI services
Switched on 12 October 2026. Since 26 October 2026 the functions contain no other provider: the overseas Anthropic and Deepgram backups were removed from the code, so no setting can send children's work outside Australia. The More page shows where it runs ("Claude: Australia (AWS Sydney)").
5.1 Claude through Amazon Bedrock (Australian routing)
Sent through the server function, per request, over a signed, encrypted connection:
- Page photos (full image) and the instructions for reading them.
- Text prompts for summaries, feedback, voice-note splitting, marking, planning and reports, built from pseudonymised data (see 6).
- Never sent: passwords, the teacher's email, the database, or other students' records beyond what the prompt needs.
- Controls in code: the function refuses any region other than Sydney or Melbourne, and any model identifier that is not an
au.inference profile. - Not turned on: Bedrock model invocation logging. Keep it off unless a school asks, because it would store prompts and answers.
5.2 Amazon Transcribe (speech)
Only for Reading WZRD's "Listen and score": the child's recording (up to about 12 MB). The function uploads it to a private bucket in Sydney, runs a transcription job in Australian English, reads the words, and deletes the recording, the transcript and the job straight afterwards; a bucket rule deletes anything left after one day. A recording is a child's voice, so treat it as personal information. Unlike the previous provider, passage names cannot be passed as hints, so names in passages may be spelled less accurately.
5.3 Provider terms to confirm
WZRD does not train on student data. In the school's data processing agreement, record: AWS's statement that Bedrock content is not used to train models or shared with model providers, retention (none by default unless invocation logging is on), and the Australian routing terms for the au. profiles. If the Anthropic or Deepgram path is ever switched back on, the earlier terms apply and the data leaves Australia.
5.4 Overseas disclosure
With the Australian routing, AI and speech processing no longer involve a disclosure outside Australia, so APP 8 is not engaged for these steps. Amazon, Supabase and Google are headquartered overseas, so the school should still note them as sub-processors and rely on their data processing terms.
6. Pseudonymisation: how names are kept out of AI text
How it works (in place). Before a text prompt leaves the browser, every student's full name, "First L." form, first name and nickname is replaced with a code such as Student-07. Where two children share a first name, both codes are used so no name is ever guessed. When the answer returns, codes are swapped back to names on screen. The mapping exists only in the teacher's browser. The server and the AI provider never receive it.
Where it applies: profile summaries, voice-note filing, writing marking, work-bundle summaries, typed-document reading. Student features (STEM feedback, comprehension, Art) are built around codes from the start.
Where it does not fully protect (known gaps):
- Page images show names (roster fixed 12 Oct 2026). The page-reading prompt no longer lists the class roster; the handwritten name is read by the AI and matched to a child on the device. The image itself usually shows the child's name, so that name still reaches the AI. This cannot be removed without not reading the name. The privacy notice says so.
- Images can contain names or faces. Anything visible in a photo is sent. Guidance to teachers is to photograph the work only, not faces.
- A privacy switch can turn pseudonymisation off. It is on by default; the Plan screen shows its state.
- Content is not scrubbed beyond names. If a child writes their address or a family detail in a story, that text is sent as written.
7. Student-facing features
7.1 How children sign in
Children have no email address and no password on WZRD. On wzrd.school (and on the class iPad) a child signs in with the class code and their own three-picture code, which the teacher prints on login cards. Where the school uses Google Workspace for Education and has allowed it, a child can sign in with their school Google account instead. Sign-ins go through a separate server function (student), which limits repeated wrong codes, locks out guessing and tells the teacher. The teacher can sign the whole class out from More.
7.2 What a child can see
A child sees their own work, practice and messages from their teacher. What they do on wzrd.school comes back to the teacher's workspace; it stays out of school reports unless the teacher switches that on.
7.3 Limits
The three-picture code is a classroom convenience, not a strong password: a child who sees another child's code could sign in as them. On a shared iPad, student mode still runs inside the teacher's signed-in session, so a determined child with the device could leave it. Recommendations: keep login cards with the teacher, keep the iPad under supervision, set an iPad passcode, and sign the teacher account out when the device is left unattended.
8. Data on the device
- What is kept: The working copy of the workspace (browser storage), image thumbnails, original page images, documents and reading recordings (browser database). This is how WZRD stays fast and keeps working with weak signal.
- Not encrypted by WZRD. It relies on the device's own protection. A lost, unlocked or shared device exposes what has been loaded on it.
- In place(9 October 2026) Signing out removes the workspace copy and clears the images, documents and recordings kept in the browser database. A recording that never reached the cloud is kept so it is not lost.
- Recommendations for schools: device passcode and auto-lock on every iPad and laptop that runs WZRD; managed devices where possible; use the school's remote-wipe process for lost devices; teachers sign out on shared computers.
9. Data lifecycle
| Stage | Behaviour | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Collection | Only what the teacher captures. No background collection, no advertising or analytics trackers | In place |
| Use | Teaching, feedback, planning, reports. Not sold, not used for marketing, not used to train AI by WZRD | In place |
| Sharing | With the AI providers per section 5, and with no one else. Reports and exports are generated on the teacher's device and shared by the teacher | In place |
| Retention | Kept until the teacher deletes it. No automatic expiry. Deleted evidence sits in Trash until the teacher empties it. Reading recordings are kept by default; a setting turns this off | Partial no retention schedule |
| Correction | A teacher can edit or delete any record, summary or note | In place |
| Deletion | More → Delete my account and data removes the database rows, the account and local copies. File deletion is incomplete today | Partial (see 11, item 3) |
| Export | Each student's evidence and the class can be exported as a file | In place |
| Backups | Daily backups are on (paid Supabase plan, confirmed 10 October 2026). Deleted data can survive in a backup until that backup ages out | In place |
10. Compliance and school obligations
This section maps WZRD to the main Australian requirements. It is a starting point for the school's own assessment.
| Requirement | How WZRD addresses it | School's responsibility |
|---|---|---|
| Privacy Act 1988 and the Australian Privacy Principles (APP 1 open management, 3 collection, 5 notice, 6 use and disclosure, 8 overseas disclosure, 11 security, 12 access, 13 correction) | Minimal collection; documented purposes; owner-only access; teacher approval; deletion and export; this document | Privacy notice to parents, consent, overseas disclosure assessment |
| State and sector rules (for example Victoria's Privacy and Data Protection Act 2014 and the Department of Education's requirements for digital tools and AI) | Designed for government, Catholic and independent settings (sector setting at sign-up) | Check the school's or system's approved-tools process and any AI policy. Government schools in Victoria have required opt-in parent consent before student information goes into an AI tool, as noted in the pilot plan. Confirm the current rule with the school |
| Notifiable Data Breaches scheme | Incident process below | Notify as required if a breach is likely to cause serious harm |
| Children's data | No student email accounts, no tracking, teacher approval, pseudonymised text, no face-photo design | Parent consent, age-appropriate notice |
Recommended documents before real student data goes in:
- A parent notice and opt-in consent form (what is stored, where, which AI services see what, how to ask for deletion).
- A data processing agreement between the school and the WZRD operator: purpose limitation, Sydney storage, listed sub-processors (Supabase, Amazon Web Services, Google), no sale, no training, deletion on request and at contract end, breach notification within an agreed time.
- A privacy impact assessment for the school's records, using this document as input.
- The principal's written approval.
11. Known gaps and how to fix them
Ordered by importance. "Effort" is the builder's estimate.
| # | Gap | Risk | Fix | Effort |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Page images show a child's handwritten name (roster no longer sent, fixed 12 Oct 2026) | The name written on the page reaches the AI on the upload path | Accepted: the name has to be read to file the page. Privacy notice states it. Possible later: blur or crop the name area on device before sending | Done / accepted |
| 2 | Fixed 9 Oct 2026 (images, documents and recordings are cleared on sign-out; a recording that never reached the cloud is kept). Sign-out does not clear images, documents and recordings in the browser database | Student work remains on a shared or lost device after sign-out | Clear all three browser stores on sign-out (with a "keep for offline" choice for the teacher's own device) | Small |
| 3 | Account deletion removes known files only; files for art, STEM, bundles, recordings and thumbnails may remain, and deleting storage rows by SQL does not guarantee the stored object is removed | Deleted data may survive in storage | Delete the teacher's whole folder through the Storage API (list then remove), including sub-folders, before removing the account | Small |
| 4 | Partly fixed 9 Oct 2026 (_headers: framing blocked, no sniffing, referrer, HSTS, camera and microphone limited to the site; the full content policy runs in report-only mode and is not yet enforced). No security headers on the web host (no Content-Security-Policy, framing or referrer rules) | A script-injection bug would have fewer barriers; the app could be framed by another site | Add a _headers file: CSP limiting scripts to the app, Supabase and the pinned CDNs, frame-ancestors 'none', X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy | Small |
| 5 | Third-party scripts (PDF, Word, Excel and Supabase libraries) load from public CDNs without integrity checks | A compromised CDN file would run in the app | Add Subresource Integrity hashes, or bundle the libraries into the site | Medium |
| 6 | Open sign-ups, no email confirmation, no limit on number of accounts | Spam accounts could run up AI costs; weak identity assurance | Switch on email confirmation, add sign-up rate limits or an invite code, keep the AWS budget alert on | Small |
| 7 | Partly fixed 9 Oct 2026 (two-step sign-in is now required for school admins and the office, enforced in the database as well as the app; teachers and year leaders do not need it yet; idle admin sessions sign out after 30 minutes; from 31 Oct 2026 it is step-up: an admin who also teaches works with their own class on a password, and the code is asked when they open the school side, which is also all the database guards with it). No multi-factor authentication for teachers | Stolen password gives access to a class's data | Enable MFA in Supabase Auth; later add school single sign-on | Medium |
| 8 | Fixed 9 Oct 2026 (the Claude and speech functions answer only wzrd.com.au, its subdomains and localhost; redeploy them to take effect). CORS on the server functions allows any origin by default | Wider exposure than needed (still requires a valid login) | Set ALLOWED_ORIGIN to the site's address | Trivial |
| 9 | Student mode runs inside the teacher's signed-in session | A child with device access could leave student mode | Separate student sessions with a teacher-held unlock; device passcodes in the meantime | Medium |
| 10 | The workspace is one JSON document saved whole; the last save wins | Two devices editing at once can overwrite each other (an integrity risk) | Per-table storage with merge rules, planned for after the pilot | Large |
| 11 | No encryption of data held on the device | Exposure if a device is lost unlocked | Rely on device passcodes and management; consider encrypting local stores | Medium |
| 12 | No automatic retention schedule | Data kept longer than needed | Add term-end review prompts and optional auto-archive for former students | Medium |
| 13 | Fixed 10 Oct 2026 (Sydney region and daily backups confirmed; region rechecked 21 Nov 2026). Region and backup settings unverified | Claims about Sydney and recoverability could be wrong | Confirm in the Supabase dashboard and record the results here | Trivial |
| 14 | No independent security review | Unknown vulnerabilities | Commission a penetration test and code review before a school-wide rollout | External |
Cross-site scripting review: the app builds pages from text templates and escapes user content when drawing it. Because there is no framework doing this automatically, one missed escape could be exploitable. Gap 4 (a Content-Security-Policy) is the main safety net, and gap 14 would test it.
12. Incident response
- Detect. Sources: a teacher report, an unusual spike in the AI audit log, an alert from Supabase or a provider, a user noticing someone else's data.
- Contain. Revoke the affected sessions in Supabase Auth, rotate the AWS access keys and the Supabase keys, and suspend the affected account or the sign-in page if needed.
- Assess. Which teachers, which students, what data, whether it was accessed or only exposed, whether serious harm is likely. Use the AI audit log and Supabase's logs.
- Notify. If an eligible data breach is likely to cause serious harm, notify the school and, through the school, affected families, and notify the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner as soon as practicable. Agree a notification time in the school's agreement.
- Recover and learn. Restore from backup if needed, fix the cause, and record what changed in this document.
Contact for security reports: the WZRD operator (details on the school agreement). Security researchers are asked to report privately and give reasonable time to fix before disclosure.
13. Quick checklist for a school IT or privacy officer
- Confirm the Supabase region reads "Sydney (ap-southeast-2)" (done 9 October 2026).
- Confirm the
pagesbucket is private and the "own pages" storage policy exists. - Confirm MFA is on for all operator accounts (Supabase, GitHub, AWS).
- Confirm the AWS spending alert is set.
- Browser origins are limited in the function code (done 9 October 2026).
- Turn on email confirmation, or restrict sign-ups to invited teachers.
- Obtain AWS's Bedrock and Transcribe data handling terms in writing for the school agreement.
- Sign the data processing agreement and issue the parent consent notice.
- Decide whether reading recordings are kept (default yes) and set the school's rule.
- Put passcodes and auto-lock on every device that runs WZRD.
- Ask for the fixes for gaps 1 to 4 before real student data goes in.
14. Change log
| Date | Change |
|---|---|
| 7 Oct 2026 | First version, written from a review of the application source, database schema and server functions. |
| 9 Oct 2026 | School accounts (section 15), two-step sign-in for admins and the office, sign-out clears the device, security headers, browser origins limited. |
| 12 Oct 2026 | Version 1.1: AI and speech moved to AWS Sydney; the class list is no longer sent with a page. |
| 14 Oct 2026 | Learning Diversity support plans (section 16). |
| 26 Oct 2026 | The overseas AI and speech backups were removed from the code. |
| 21 Nov 2026 | Version 1.2: hosting on AWS Sydney; database region rechecked; SES and Stripe listed; children's sign-in on wzrd.school; school reports. |
15. School accounts (added 9 October 2026)
- In placeschools, memberships, join requests, invites and class summaries sit in tables the app cannot read or write directly; the only way in is through database functions that check who is asking. Tested on a real Postgres (
supabase/tests/test_school_claim.py). - In placeroles are enforced by the database, not the screen. A class teacher cannot ask for the school overview. A year leader receives only their years. A specialist receives only their subject's recency, with no groups or NAPLAN. The office receives names and classes only. The principal and deputy receive everything.
- In placea teacher is enrolled in a school only when they accept, and their class summary is only sent after that. It holds names, groups, NAPLAN levels, report status and how recently evidence was captured; it never holds the work itself, photos or recordings. Leaving the school deletes it.
- In placeclaims are checked by a person at WZRD (phone call or reply from the school email); the console is limited to listed support accounts.
- In placeadmin and office roles need two-step sign-in (authenticator app), because schools often share a generic password.
- Not yettwo-step sign-in for the support console and for year leaders; single sign-on with school accounts; an access log written by the server (reads by leaders are logged only on the leader's own device); issue case files are private to the principal's own account and are not yet shared with the named teacher.
- In place(21 November 2026) a school report uploaded to a child's profile sits in the private bucket. Staff of the same school can open it (read only), so the report follows the child to next year's teacher. Staff at other schools cannot.
- Known gap 1 above still stands: names can reach the AI when a page is read.
16. Learning Diversity (support plans), added 14 October 2026
Support plans hold disability information, which is sensitive information under the Privacy Act. Three layers: what to do (adjustments, seen by everyone who teaches the child and printed in relief packs), the plan (evidence, dates, needs; class teacher and Learning Diversity staff) and the why (NCCD category, level, imputation reasons, uploaded reports; Learning Diversity staff and the principal, plus the class teacher inside their own plan form). Layer 3 is stored in separate tables, every open of layers 2 and 3 is written to access_log, holders of the learning_diversity permission must use two-step sign-in, and the category, level and reports are never sent to AI. If the school turns on AI help with plans, the teacher's words and the adjustments go with the child as a code; government schools start with it off. Uploaded reports stay on the device in the current app; on the server they go to a private bucket served only by short-lived signed URLs. Medical action plans and medication are out of scope. See BRIEF-learning-diversity.md and supabase/learning-diversity.sql.